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Blockchains have gotten popular in recent times, owing to the security, 
anonymity, and lack of any third-party involvement. Blockchains essentially are record 
keeping tools that record any transactions between involved parties. One of the key 
aspects of handling and navigating of any autonomous traffic on the streets, is secured 
and simple means of communication. This thesis explores distribution of minimum 
resources between multiple autonomous agents, by settling conflicts using events of 
random nature. The thesis focusses on two specific events, tossing of a coin and the game 
of rock, paper, and scissors (RPS). An improvement on the traditional game of RPS is 
further suggested, called rock, paper, scissors, and hammer (RPSH). And then seamless 
communication interface to enable secure interaction is setup using blockchains with 
smart contracts. A new method of information exchange called Sealed Envelope 
Exchange is proposed to eliminate any involvement of third-party agents in the 
monitoring of conflict resolution. A scenario of assigning the sole remaining parking spot 
in a filled parking space, between two vehicles is simulated and then the conflict is 
resolved in a fair manner without involving a third-party agent. This is achieved by 
playing a fair game of RPSH by using blockchains and simulating cross chain interaction 
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Blockchains were first introduced, in 2008, by Satoshi Nakamato in his paper 
introducing bitcoins [1]. The advent of blockchain has been compared to the rise of 
internet and it is being referred to as the next big technological innovation. It is a secured 
digital ledger for economic book-keeping. It can securely record any information that can 
be expressed as code [2]. Blockchains enables decentralized exchange of information 
using secured keys, that allows authorization of transactions, by all involved parties. 
Blockchain has found its use in various applications from finance, real estate to 
healthcare. Operations that earlier needed a third party to regulate and secure transactions 
are not needed anymore.   
 
The blocks serve as information while the chain serves as the database [3]. This 
database is usually a public ledger that is updated as new blocks are added to it and the 
chain grows.  This database can also be a private ledger, thereby making the blockchain 
private. Such a blockchain has limited access and only few people or groups can make 
transactions (create blocks) on the chain.  
 
Blocks in a blockchain serve as a form of database. These can be used to store any 
form of data. Ideally, they are used to save information about successful transactions. 
Once a transaction is successfully verified, the blocks record the information, and a new 
block is formed. The first block or the building block of the chain is called the genesis 
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block. Along with the string stored, the blocks also store the hash of the previous block 
and their own hash.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Hash Encryption  
 
“\x00\xf9\x81}\t*\xef#\xb5\x97\x95d\xb4^R\xa3\xa4EP\x1c\xc5\xb1\xa3\xd4\xd
9\xce\xe2@5Py5” This string of various hexadecimal characters is just the encrypted 
version of the string “Hansel and Gretel”, while 
“\x010\xbb\xf01<Q\x93F\x87\xec\xce\xc5I\x84\x1fk\xd8\xf1n\x9c\xe3\xa7\xd20>\x90)\
xe2a” is the encrypted string for “Hansl and Gretel”. A hash is the encrypted version of a 
string as shown in Figure 1.1. A hash function converts a given string into a series of 
hexadecimal characters. This helps make the chain tamper proof. There are certain 
requirements for the selection of a hash function.  
1. The hash function should convert strings of any given length into an encrypted 
string of fixed length. 
2. No two strings should ever result in the same output. 
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3. There should be no way of converting an encrypted string back into the 
original string.  
4. A small change in the input string should result in a major difference in the 
output string [4].  
 
Even though no two strings should ever result in the same output. There are 
infinite possibilities for the input string but only a finite number of possibilities for the 
output string, owing to the fixed size limitation. In rare cases, this can result in two 
strings having the same output. This is known as collision. The probability of this can be 
reduced by choosing a good hash function [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Hash [5] 
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 The encryption ability of a hash function serves a very important application in 
securing block chains. When any transaction is carried out and the information is stored 
inside a block. The block generates a hash from this data. Since, the hash of a string 
cannot be the same as another string. Anytime an attacker attempts to modify data in a 
block, the hash of the block changes. As shown in figure 1.2, every block records the 
time, transaction, and the hash of the previous block along with its own. So, if the 
attacker were to make any changes to block n, it would change the hash of the block, so 
when the next block attempts to verify the authenticity of the transaction by comparing 
the hash of the previous block with the modified hash, it results in an error. This makes 
the chain tamper proof. 
  
 Hash functions are Trapdoor One-Way functions (TOWF),  
𝑓𝑓:𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑦𝑦 where, 
𝑓𝑓 is a unidirectional function. So, it is easy to compute 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑦𝑦, but nearly impossible 
to obtain 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑓𝑓−1(𝑦𝑦) for given 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑌. So, a hash function, ℎ can be described as [6],  
ℎ:𝑀𝑀 →  {0,1}1, with ℎ(𝑚𝑚)  =  𝑚𝑚�   
 
 Owing to the numerous advantages that blockchains have to offer, they have been 
used for several different applications. The most popular being cryptocurrencies. But 
apart from those, they are also used for record keeping, building smart contracts, 
monitoring supply chain, data backup, transportation networks and IOT. 
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1.1 Blockchain Network 
A blockchain network is a set of agents/nodes working on the same blockchain, 
where each node holds copies of the chain. All these nodes form a peer to peer network. 
Each node is assigned a private key and a public key. The sender authenticates the 
transaction using their private key and their peers can access this using the public key. An 
invalid transaction is discarded. Valid transactions are authenticated using and added to 
the chain. Each block on the chain is verified by the hash of the previous block. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Peer to Peer Transaction 
 
1.2 Proof of Work 
Let us say Mack, went to a coffee shop and paid for his coffee with bitcoins. 
Mack returns home accesses the chain, removes the transaction, and later shares this 
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modified chain with his peers. This would redeposit all the coins back in his wallet. This 
is called double spending, wherein one of the users modify previous transactions or delete 
them and add them back to the chain. This way a user can use the same coins multiple 
times. This makes it extremely important that all the nodes share the same copy of the 
chain [7]. Just as it is important for an orchestra to work together, to produce a beautiful 
melody, it is important for all the nodes to be in sync.  
 
To avoid this all the nodes creating blocks are required to provide a cryptographic 
proof. There are several ways of doing this, but the most popular method is by adding a 
nonce. A nonce is a small integer value, that along with other hash parameters reduces 
the hash value than the current target value [7]. The resulting hash value starts with a 
certain number of zeroes and there is no way to predict what the correct value will be. 
The nodes try running different computations on their validated blocks. This method 
utilizes the computing power as a factor for each node, to assess validity of the blocks. 
This can increase the block interval for a chain. The block interval is the frequency with 
which content is written to a blockchain. A difficult computation will increase the block 
interval, which will consequently result in fewer blocks being written on the chain and 
vice versa [7].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1.3 Smart Contracts  
Any business of conventional commerce involves signing contracts. Assume that 
there are two parties A and B. A signs the contract first and sends it to B for being signed. 
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A is at a disadvantage here since there is no guarantee that B might be fair. The only way 
to make the process fair is to either have them sign the contract face to face or do it 
remotely but in the presence of a fair third party [8]. Such a situation demands that smart 
contracts be fairer and more convenient.  
 
Kim et al. [8] discuss the two different approaches on solving this issue. The first 
one is using procedural programming. The contract formed lays out all the tasks in order 
and the protocols. It becomes a unit of the organization that governs the contact and the 
all the tasks are performed. The second one is that the contract itself becomes the 
contractor. This can be enforced either by any of the parties involved in the transaction or 
a fairer third party. This party is assumed to be efficient and impartial. These contracts 
can lay out the obligations and how they are to be enforced without following up. They 
do not track the progress, rather they just ensure that all requirements are met.   
 
1.4 Private Blockchains   
Public blockchains are not suitable for some commercial applications, owing to 
the universal public access to the chain. Another type of blockchain, with a closed 
environment that only a few known nodes can access, can help solve the problem. This is 
known as a private blockchain. Consensus algorithms and smart contracts help make 
private blockchains more efficient than public blockchain [9]. Private blockchains are 
faster, safer, and more efficient as compared to public blockchains.  
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1.5 Cross Chain Communication    
Over the years several different blockchains have been developed. All of these 
work independently, without any cooperative operation. There is a lack of 
communication among these chains, which hinders any development that could result 
with resource sharing within multiple different chains [10]. Within the current ecosystem, 
new blockchains are created to meet any emerging needs. This results in fragments of 
contained spaces which can hinder the growth of the industries deploying these chains. 
Another disadvantage is that with each chain, industries might need to make certain trade 
off, compromises with security to leverage higher efficiency or vice versa [11]. This can 
create certain limitations for individual chains. Essentially it is highly impractical for 
blockchain to serve as a ‘one size fits all’ solution, where a single chain supports all 
transactions and performs all desired operations globally [12].  
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Figure 1.4 Cross Chain Communication [13] 
 
As shown in Figure 1.4 Cross chain communication is the means for 
interoperability between independent chains. Chains can interact with one another by 
means of resource exchange between independent and unrelated blockchains. This can 
Cross chain communication facilitates direct transfer between different blockchains. This 
is especially useful when dealing with multiple private blockchains, as it provides a 
means of transfer between willing agents with different ledgers. It helps link independent 
chains [13].   
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Cross chain communication has several advantages to offer. There is no need for a 
trusted third party or escrow. Verified nodes can transfer assets over secured channels. 
Cryptocurrencies can be exchanged freely. Chains can access common or other chain’s 
database. This can help in developing smart contracts or trigger any other transfer [10]. 
Headers and events from multiple chains can be verified and consensus algorithms can be 
developed for multi-chain operations. Chains compromising on certain features can 
leverage them from other chains thereby supporting cross chain development [11]. 
 
There are several different methods of implementing cross chain communication. 
Even though such a type of interaction can be tricky with complex protocols and the 
technology is still under development, there are ways this can be implemented. One of 
the easiest ways is to have a trusted third party like an escrow to facilitate all asset 
transfers. The party can be one that both the users on different chains trust. The 
intermediary can verify all transactions and activities before the final transfer is 
initialized. This method is more centralized in nature and compromises on any 
advantages, decentralization might offer to its users. Using sidechains that support 
multiple blockchains but are not dependent on any of the main chain can help avoid 
centralization. Any assets to be transferred can be held in the side chain until the 
transaction is completed. Another method is using hash locking. Hash locking uses a 
particular hash value. Both parties need to verify the hash value in stipulated time, as 
defined by the protocols to complete a transfer successfully. This method increases 
security but compromises on transaction throughput by increasing required computation. 
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This has limited applications. A more feasible method that the thesis focusses on is called 
the distributed private key control. This method uses a distributed private key exchange. 
Assets are locked on transfer and can only be accessed by private keys specific to all 
involved parties. This method helps maintain decentralization along with reducing 
computations. This also does not require any kind of modifications to the chain and 
works irrespective of the nature of the blockchains involved [13]. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Smart Contracts in Cross Chain Communication 
 
 Smart Contracts are an essential part of any blockchain peer to peer network. 
They help ensure all transactions are regulated as per requirements. Figure 1.5 illustrates 
the implementation of smart contracts in blockchain communication. The first blockchain 
initiates the transaction, but the coins are not yet released to the client (Blockchain 2). As 
discussed earlier, smart contracts act as an overseer to make sure all tasks are 
accomplished between the involved parties. Once this is verified, only then are the funds 
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released. These also make sure that the tasks are accomplished successfully in the 
stipulated time, or else the transaction fails.  
 
To quote Aleks Larsen, a senior associate of the firm Blockchain capital, “Strong 
interoperability could shield users from the trade-offs that blockchains make and allow 
them to interchangeably leverage the optimizations of different consensus mechanisms 
and virtual machines, in many cases off-loading tasks that are better accomplished on 
other chains and letting each focus on its core competencies. If we end up in a world of 
many blockchains, interoperability can make them more useful, user-friendly, efficient 
and scalable.” [14].  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
IoT and Blockchain  
 
 
 IoT stands for Internet of Things, it is a rapidly emerging technology that plays a 
very important role in connecting multiple devices so they can interact, be queried, and 
controlled directly by its users. It connects physical devices so they can be operated 
remotely. It is a very innovative way for humans, organizations, and other entities to 
interact with each other seamlessly. IoT is dependent on various platforms and devices, 
that process a lot of information to keep the network running. A critical requirement of 
the IoT is that the devices must be connected to the internet and be interconnected to each 
other [15]. This can put a toll on cost, energy, and device lifetime. IoT applications are 
used in fields ranging from healthcare, education, and resource management, for 
example, using RFID tags for inventory management [16] or using a network connecting 
the alarm system to the coffee machine [17]. 
 
IoT networks generate a large amount of data. All the devices collect data from 
their surroundings and use it to plan their tasks. As a result, devices record every bit of 
information regarding person’s habits, schedule, and preferences etc. Current IoT models 
work on a centralized client-server model, this leaves the network highly susceptible to 
data theft.   With growing IoT technology it is important to give users complete authority 
of their data [15]. 
Autonomous vehicles use networks to interact with each other. Internetwork 
communication between fleets of cars can help coordinate, while data collected during 
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operation supports further AI development. These vehicles require extensive data to 
operate effectively. Sensors like cameras, GPS, wheel encoders and LiDar are used for 
3D mapping of the environment [18]. Thus, IoT is also a big part of autonomous vehicles, 
that keep it connected for smooth operation.  
 
IoT introduces a wide range of risks and security threats. An extended attack on 
even a single node can compromise the complete system. Many nodes are deployed for 
specific function such as cloud storage, computational capacity or saving energy. These 
nodes sometimes do not possess enough capabilities to protect themselves from an 
outside attack. Centralized service providers can further steal data from all the 
interconnected devices [19]. Current security protocols rely on brute force measures for 
cutting any access, an outside attacker might have once the system is infected. Such 
methods are hardly an option in mission critical systems such as manufacturing, delivery, 
health and especially V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle communication) [20]. 
 
Blockchains have the privacy feature built into their design. A decentralized 
approach can help users gain complete authority over their data. A peer to peer network is 
a more ideal choice in securing users data and providing them with more freedom. 
Furthermore, a peer to peer consensus algorithm can support securing any exchange 
between the interconnected devices on the network, with a transaction log monitoring 
each device’s activity. Ali et. al. (2017) [19] described this environment as a ‘trust-less’ 
one, which has more accountability built into it.    
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Blockchains can be used to maintain an immutable data access and operations log 
for all IoT operations. Each device can be assigned a private blockchain or a side chain to 
a root blockchain, with each chain being responsible for maintaining records for all 
sensor feeds and data exchange. The root blockchain forms a larger, decentralized private 
network. Only authorized devices are allowed access to this network and the root chain is 
responsible for logging any access requests for the user’s data. This can further create an 
economy of personal data, where willing users can choose to sell their data to any 
interested parties [19]. 
 
Blockchains bring decentralized computing and storage, along with 
authentication, digital presence, and access control for users both in the public and 
business domain, that can help develop current IoT technology [21].  Smart contracts on 
blockchains can enable supporting more secure and flexible information exchange 
protocols. Smart contracts support interoperability of heterogeneous IoT smart contracts. 
Message exchange is treated similar to financial transactions and smart contracts can be 
leveraged to tracing any transaction between the interconnected devices and between the 
user and the devices. This can enable autonomous operation between all devices, while 
securing the user against data theft. Communication with devices or networks outside the 
network, i.e. with other chains or smart contracts can be blocked off. A smart contract is 
like a script with a unique address. The script is a reference to transactions that trigger 
data exchanges within the devices, that are part of the network. Since, all devices own the 
same copy of the contract, tampering is virtually impossible [22]. 
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Various IoT security measures that can help secure the data channels and keep 
any unwanted visitors out, have been tested over time. Encrypting the data to avoid any 
tampering can help maintain confidentiality. Encryption is performed at the sender end 
while it is decrypted when received by the desired receiver. Only authorized users should 
be allowed access to the data. It is important that surrounding unauthorized nodes do not 
access any of the sensitive data. Receiver should authenticate correct receipt of package 
throughout the network. Certification helps confirm the identity of both entities that are 
communicating with each other. Access control can help block illegal access by any 
person, object, or machine. Certificate technology with identity identification can ensure 
no leak [17]. 
 
Current security measures for IoT make the model highly centralized. Using 
blockchain technology can help move the model towards a more decentralized approach. 
Using blockchain as a main archive helps instantly track and verify data. Since, the 
system is regularly updated with the latest block there is no scope for a point of failure. 
Once created, blockchains are immutable and incorruptible. Any attempted modification 
is flagged which nullifies any data tampering attacks [20]. Transactions are executed and 
stored via census algorithms. However, since public blockchains lack scalability that can 
lead to problems with an IoT infrastructure. Jiang et. al. (2019) [23] talk about a multi 
chain model that implements cross chain protocols with smart contracts and consensus 
algorithm for efficient and secure IoT data management. The model is a decentralized 
access model which optimizes device management and converts data into cash flow. 
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Access control protocols are put in place for privacy protection. They experiment proved 
that such a model was more suitable for managing IoT devices. It proved to be more 
efficient than a general blockchain structure. 
 
Data gathered by IoT devices usually contain a lot of private information about 
the users and various interactions between the user and the system. Most IoT systems are 
highly centralized and have single points of failure that can hinder scalability. Existing 
methods of securing these systems and providing privacy protection are under third party 
entities. These entities also control all or most data storage servers and can adopt 
surveillance systems to misuse any of the personal data. Moreover, the network 
architecture faces a lot of threats. The entire network can be paralyzed, or a DOS attack 
can result in a massive failure. Users barely have any control over their data. Also, there 
is no accountability by third parties on network failures or data thefts. Lack of traceability 
follows, and users must place their blind faith in the system.  As more and more devices 
are added centralized servers will lose their efficiency and it will become tougher to grow 
the IoT network, as these servers won’t be able to handle the increasing amount of end to 
end communication between all these devices [24].  
 
The shift towards integrating blockchain can improve the network making it 
stronger against any attacks. It will remove all single points of failures. New servers will 
not require third party entities to handle the network traffic anymore. Malicious software 
updates can be avoided and all the users in the network can verify transfer of data. All 
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end to end communications can be authenticated and traceability can be maintained since 
all transactions are recorded onto a public ledger that is shared among all the users. This 
is further validated by the users, resulting in a tamper free environment. Users can 
monetize services provided and all transactions can be easily secured [24].  
 
Cybersecurity is one of the most challenging barriers for IoT development. IoT 
devices are physical entities that are isolated and are subject to tampering. Also, these are 
connected to other devices and therefore it becomes difficult to protect individual devices 
and also secure all end to end communications. Also, IoT devices have limited 
computational power, so it is nearly impossible to deploy any sophisticated security 
protocols. Such a network with several interconnected devices, that are constantly 
communicating and sending messages throughout the entire network, over the internet, is 
highly susceptible to attacks. To secure such a network, two important steps that need to 
be taken are that, countermeasures need to be setup that are designed specific to each 
device and more computational power needs to be reserved for security purposes [24].  
 
Data is collected from IoT users without any explicit consent. This deprives users 
of any control over when and where their data is shared or sold. The concern with IoT 
networks is not just data that but also data handling. Along with data collection another 
aspect is data storage, the volume of data collected every second from all these devices 
demands massive cloud storage. Without IoT platforms that can guarantee both 
scalability and privacy protection into their design, it is nearly impossible to develop 
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these networks. Blockchain networks store a large amount of data over blockchain peers, 
which can offer data integrity to the users and a resilient network [24].  
 
With growing networks and more complex security protocols and massive data 
storage support, there is also a growing concern of increasing maintenance costs. Cloud 
based infrastructure not only adds to the high maintenance costs but also communication 
costs. But blockchains use dedicated servers that are significantly cheaper. Moreover, 
since users can be monetized for using their computational and storage abilities, these 
prove to be a big step in handing control to the users themselves. Users can further gain 
cryptocurrency in exchange for their personal data [24].  
 
Once a smart contract is executed, no intermediary can stop it from running or 
block it. Transactions play an important role in supporting these operations. If a code is 
sent, an input parameter can be set depending on the end point. For, a null account the 
transaction can trigger setting up a new smart contract, that will then be converted for 
interchain operability and executed. This can help when there are many devices or as 
newer devices are added to the network and thus blockchain can support smoother 
scalability and secure addition of new devices [25].   
 
There are numerous advantages of such a model, and it can help grow several 
industries. Insurance companies for example can utilize this to calculate premiums and 
keep records of all their clients more secure. It can also help establish a network that can 
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support payment from the clients directly to the insurance provider and aid in rendering 
services from the providers directly to the clients. The model can rid the agents of any 
third- party services that might be required. Smart contracts can help keep all processes 
compliant to legal standards and clients can be protected from any fraud. Companies can 
migrate to using cryptocurrencies [24]. Any industry requiring trading via third party 
service providers can rely on this model for ubiquitous service provision. Client 
confidentiality can be maintained along with assurance of secure payments and no data 
thefts. Companies can have an oversight over all trades via the ledger. A greater 
advantage would be to the supply chain industry. With unique identifiers, warehouses and 
distributors can have a wider control over all decisions regarding material distribution. 
Real time authentication of requests and subsequent provisions of service can be assured. 
Multi resource handling, of a variety of products with several clients can be easily 
handled.  
  
 Not all devices can engage in the network and keep records or support all of the 
operations on the network due to resource constraints. So, all devices need to be assigned 
specific duties. So, some devices can be assigned to keep contributing to the blockchain 
while others can support block validation and support decentralized consensus. Figure 3.1 





 Figure 2.1: Integration of IoT devices and Blockchain [24] 
 
 
 Devices can act as gateways, while blockchain supports all the 
communication between them. Devices act as end points. This is shown in the top left 
diagram in figure 2.1. This makes the devices accountable for all the traffic and not all 
communication needs to be stored. Smart contracts in place can assist in supporting 
transactions and securing all communication. Such an infrastructure requires more 
computational power. But the network is not purely decentralized as all communication 
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initiated by the device, first passes through the blockchain. In the second approach, as 
shown in the top right diagram in figure 2.1, the devices issue transactions to the chain. 
All the devices support encryption and the blockchain simply supports the devices in 
their operations. The architecture can only be supported by complex devices and will 
require increased computation for every device involved. For events where devices are 
already secure and only require the blockchain for record keeping, the system as 
illustrated in the bottom right diagram of figure 2.1 is more suited. All the devices can 
initiate transactions and can interact without using the chain. The devices choose what 
data needs to be recorded and accordingly communicate with the chain. Such an 
architecture is more desired with devices that communicate constantly and are reliable. 
The architecture illustrated in the bottom right diagram of figure 2.1 is more of an 
extension to the previous architecture. Apart from just controlling the communication 
between devices, here the devices also control any or all transactions initiated and only 
some of the transactions are passed through the blockchain [24].  
 
Consider a case where devices fail during operation in a network. Blockchains via smart 
contract can support failure monitoring of devices. This ensures devices are performing 
their assigned tasks. This can also be used for data recovery from failed devices or to 
setup alerts. As more devices are added to the network, the number of nodes increases, 
and it becomes easier to find devices that can support any failed nodes. Such a node can 
support scaling and it can improve as more devices are added to the system [26]. 
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 Cryptography can ensure data security and privacy protection in an IoT 
environment. There are several methods of achieving this. Almost all of them not only 
protect the user’s data but also their identities. This helps provide a completely secure 
framework. Data collection is based on the hash function used. Time taken for encryption 
is also determined by the size of the group. With a large number of devices encryption 




















Efficient Resource Allocation 
 
  
 Sometimes multiple operations are needed to be carried out using limited 
resources. These operations can be seen in day to day life. The problem can be described 
as Distribution of indivisible finite objects among a finite number of agents or processes. 
This can be seen in examples like distribution of labor, project management, budget 
allocation or even wireless network handling. In all such cases, enhancing the 
performance of the system is highly desired but the complexity involve with optimally 
allocating resources can get really challenging [28].  
  
 Deterministic algorithms, linear programming, dynamic programming and, 
heuristic algorithms have been used in the past to solve such problems. But in many 
cases, especially with non-deterministic problems or cases where not much problem 
specific information is available. Also, cases where given activities are indivisible. In all 
such events the computation becomes incredibly tough. A new approach to solving such 
problems as described by Ergin (2002) [29], is a priority model. Ergin talks about 
resource allocation based on priority. A finite number of objects are to be distributed and 
the agents have a fixed preference and every agent receives at least one object. A pareto 
distribution is used to develop the model and assignments are distributed based on their 
superiority.   
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 Solving problems based on priority can make the computation simple but it only 
works if the structure is acyclical. Once objects become scarce, the model becomes 
restrictive and less efficient. Also, the model assumes that all the agents receive at least 
one object each. In scenarios with n+1 agents and only n objects, where n𝜖𝜖N, the pareto 
efficiency for the model drops. I have focused on solving this problem with a much 
simpler and realistic approach.  
 
Figure 3.1: Parking Spot Allocation 
 
 Imagine the scenario illustrated in figure 3.1 with two autonomous agents. Both 
need access to a parking spot. Both agents are close to a parking lot with two entry and 
exit points. But there is only one spot remaining. The agents now must mutually come to 
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a unanimous and fair agreement on who gets the spot. Both the agents have an equal right 
of way and are equidistant from the parking spot. There is no further information 
available about the two agents. We do not know their place of origin, their destination, or 
their fuel status. A unanimous decision is important to arrive at the required outcome. 
The two agents share no performance objectives other than the desire to park at the said 
spot. Assuming both agents are fair, deciding here is particularly tough because both 
agent’s preferences are categorically opposed. There is no mutually advantageous 
outcome to this situation [30]. The error costs associated with the given situation are 
dependent on whether the agents come to a unanimous decision. If the agents base their 
own decisions on individual benefits, they can end up crashing into each other. This 
creates a conflict between their self and group interests [31]. Arriving at a decision can 
help them proceed as a cohesive entity in a dynamic environment.    
3.1 Coin Toss 
 With time, there have been several optimization algorithms that have been 
developed for solving complex problems. All these algorithms consider numerous factors 
that may directly or indirectly affect the parties involved.  Each of these have their own 
advantages and disadvantages. At the end, all of the algorithms, with their diverse 
approach share a common goal of achieving an optimized or fair decision. Decision 
making is a complex topic, even when concerned with everyday life. Even though there 
are optimal ways of choosing among alternatives, in carefully controlled well-structured 
settings. People do not rely on principles of optimal performance. It is easier to use 
 27 
heuristic methods over algorithmic strategies, even though these strategies generate 
deviations from optimal judgements [32].  
 
 Accumulating information to choose between several options is desirable, but it is 
not always feasible. The process itself can be tedious and time consuming. Sometimes, it 
can also complicate a situation and result in the inability to respond effectively to a 
situation due to an over analytical approach or an excess of available information. This is 
known as analysis paralysis. In such situations, a random decision-making alternative can 
help decide. Such an alternative does not require any arguments or information. Such 
methods help make quick, straight forward, and fair decisions.  
 
 A coin toss is an event of tossing a fair coin in the air to determine which side it 
lands on. A coin toss gives both sides an equal chance, it is efficient and quick. This 
method does not have any effect on the outcome as well. Moreover, no actions taken by 
the involved parties can influence the final decision as well. This method makes it easier 
to decide when none of the options to a situation have an advantage on the others and are 
weighed equally [33]. A random method of decision making can also ensure choosing 
between options with equal merit.   
 
 Even though events or practices that are random in nature can be of advantage in 
certain decision-making situations, not all of them are feasible or can be applied in every 
situation. For example, an event like a coin toss requires a third party to ensure that the 
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whole process of flipping the coin is fair. The involved parties further need to agree on 
definitions of a fair coin and a fair method of flipping. For situations without a mediator 
or a third party, it can get difficult to keep the complete process fair and structured. So, 
such situations require tools that carry the same advantages of a random event, but also 
need to be simple enough to be carried out in the presence of only those parties that are 
affected by the outcome and deter such parties from trying to use unfair means to 
influence the outcome to their advantage.  
 
3.2 Rock, Paper and Scissors     
 
 
Figure 3.2: Rock, Paper and, Scissors 
Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) is a fundamental non-cooperative game. It is a basic 
model that can help the decision-making process in non-deterministic and complex 
environments. The game has three candidates, Rock (R), Paper (P) and Scissors (S). Each 
player must make either an R, P or S gesture. The gestures are ideally to be made 
simultaneously, to avoid any unfair advantage that the player with a late response might 
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gain from knowing the opponents move. The rules to the game, as illustrated in figure 3.2 
are simple, R beats S, S beats P and P beats R. Choosing the same gesture i.e. R vs R, P 
vs P or S vs S results in a draw. Thus, the game can have a total of two outcomes, a 
player wins while the other loses or both draw [34]. Since, deviating from once strategy 
has little or no effect to the outcome, assuming the other player does not deviate, game 
theory predicts that the choices by either players will be completely randomized and there 
is no chance of exploitation, also referred to as the Nash equilibrium strategy [35]. 
Irrespective of what one player picks, there will always be some strategy that guarantees 
that the opponent wins.   
 
 There have been several instances in history where RPS has supported scenarios 
which required a fair decision-making model. It helped settle disputes and make fair and 
unanimous decisions. The game does not require the involvement of a third party and that 
also helps keep the process limited to the invested agents. In 2006, a federal judge 
ordered the defendant and the opposing counsel to settle a trivial debate over a 
deposition, by playing a game of RPS. In 2005, the CEO of a Japanese company decided 
to auction of his assets worth $12-16 million. The decision as to which firm would be 
responsible for carrying out the auction, was decided by a game of RPS between two 
firms, he believed to be good but was unable to pick one from the other. Several more 




 Several variations to RPS have been developed over the years. Each of these 
make the process more random, by adding in more candidates and thereby lowering the 
probability of selection for each. This makes the game more challenging. Two popular 
variations are, Rock, Paper, Scissors, Fire, Water (RPSFW) and Rock, Paper, Scissors, 
Lizard, Spock (RPSLS).  
 The rules for the RPSFW combination are,  
• Paper beats Rock 
• Scissors beats Paper  
• Water beats Fire 
• Water loses to everything other than fire and 
• Fire wins against everything but water. 
The rules for the RPSLS combination are,  
• Spock beats Scissors and Rock 
• Lizard and paper beat Spock 
• Rock and Scissors beat lizard. [36] 
Each of these renditions look simple and promising, one disadvantage that they all 
share is the possibility of drawing. The possibility of drawing between the agents, makes 
the situation complicated and time consuming. Thereby making all of these unreliable. 
Running a simulation where two players played a fair game of RPS 500 times. The 
results of the simulation, as shown in Figure 2.3, were that player 1 won 45% of the 
games, while player 2 won 20% of the games. Unfortunately, both of the players tied for 
about 35% of the games or 175 games.  
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Figure 3.3: Simulation Results 
3.3 Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer    
 Owing to the issue of the possibility of the game drawing and the transaction 
coming to a halt, a new rendition of the game Rock, Paper and Scissors, called Rock, 
Paper, Scissors and Hammer (RPSH), as shown in figure 3.4 is proposed [37]. The game 
has only two options, 1 and 0, to pick from which makes it easier for the players. The 
player that picks the first option is called the regular player and all the choices for the 
player are referred to as regular choices i.e. regular 1 and regular 0. While every choice 
that the opponent picks are labeled as alternate choices i.e. alternat 1 and alternate 0. The 
rules are simple,  
• Alternate 0 beats regular 1 
• Regular 0 beats alternate 0 
• Alternate 1 beats regular 0 
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• Regular 1 beats Alternate 1 
 
Figure 3.4: Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer  
 
 The game can only be played between two players, but it offers the advantage that 
the game never ties. This makes the process simple as each game ends in only two 
possibilities, either player 1 wins or player 2 wins.   
 
 Each player’s set of possible options is denoted by, 𝐴𝐴 =  {0, 1} and ∆𝐴𝐴 =
 {(𝑝𝑝(0), 𝑝𝑝(1)  ∈  𝑅𝑅3 | 𝑝𝑝(0) > 0,𝑝𝑝(1)  >  0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝(0)  +  𝑝𝑝(1)  =  1} denotes the set of 
probability distributions on A. Assuming player i and player j are two players competing 
such that, 𝑤𝑤 ∈  {1,2}, 𝑗𝑗 ∈  {1,2} and 𝑤𝑤 ≠  𝑗𝑗. Figure 3.5 shows Player i’s payoff matrix.  
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Figure 3.5: Player i's payoff matrix 
Player i's payoff is represented by,  
 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗)) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗)  ∈  ∆(𝐴𝐴) 𝑥𝑥 ∆(𝐴𝐴)  =
 ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)∈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴                (1) 
 
Now, it is known that a pair of mixed strategies (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) is a mixed Nash 
equilibrium, if either of the player’s strategy is the best response to the opponent’s strategy 





















 𝑥𝑥 (−1) +  1
2
 𝑥𝑥 (1)  =  0 ∀ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∈  𝐴𝐴 (2) 
 








)) is a mixed Nash equilibrium.  
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 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(0) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(1)     (4) 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(0) + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(1)  =  1      (5)    
 1 + 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 1) = 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(0)  >  0    (6) 
It is known that if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 ∆(𝐴𝐴) is a best response to 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  𝜖𝜖 ∆(𝐴𝐴) and player i plays 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 such 
that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) > 0, then 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� ≥  𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝚤𝚤́ ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� ∀ 𝑎𝑎𝚤𝚤́ ∈ 𝐴𝐴 [38]. This means that 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(1) =
0 ∀ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the best response to 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 .  
Also,  
 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�0,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(0) − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(1) implying 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(0) > 0   (7) 




), is not a best response to any 
mixed strategy.  This proves that there can be no mixed Nash equilibrium in any other 






 There are two pure strategies in the RPSH game. (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) denotes the generic social 
state of the population, with players using a strategy of either 0 or 1. At time t assuming, 
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player 𝑎𝑎0(𝑤𝑤) played 0, while player 𝑎𝑎1(𝑤𝑤) played 1. Now, 𝑎𝑎0(𝑤𝑤)  +  𝑎𝑎1(𝑤𝑤) = 𝑁𝑁. Thus, 𝑥𝑥 =
 𝑛𝑛0(𝑡𝑡)
𝑁𝑁
 and 𝑦𝑦 =  𝑛𝑛1(𝑡𝑡)
𝑁𝑁
, where 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0,𝑦𝑦 ≥ 0. The total number of different 
social states for a population of size N is expressed as 𝑁𝑁 = (𝑁𝑁+1)(𝑁𝑁+2)
2
. So, for N=2, total 
number of social states are 6 [39]. The evolutionary trajectory for the state space system 
for RPSH, would form a triangle in 2-dimensional space with center point of the triangle 






Figure 3.6: Social State Space of RPSH 
      
3.4 IoT Devices and RPSH  
 Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer is a non-cooperative simple game, that helps 
arrive at a decision between options that hold equal merit, every time. One important 
aspect of playing the game is that the opponents need to reveal their gesture or their 
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choice at the same time. This is an easy condition to fulfil when all involved parties are 
physically present at the same location or are visually connected, so that they may be able 
to present their choice without knowing any of the opponent’s choices, thereby playing a 
fair match.  
 
 Users connected over an IoT network face a disadvantage when attempting to use 
such a process for making a decision. Such a situation requires a different approach when 
playing the game. Certain requirements to this are,  
• The players should be able to share their selection without any interference from 
unrelated third parties 
• None of the players should be able to change their selection once shared  
• None of the players should have access to what the opponent has selected without 
having selected themselves 
• The players should be able to stay anonymous if they choose so 
This can be achieved by integrating a blockchain network using a smart contract to 
govern the transaction between the users.  
 
 Using a two key encryption method such as RSA, the user can encrypt their 
selection and share it with their opponent. Once the first player shares their encrypted 
selection and the public key with the opponent, a smart contract triggers a second 
transaction, allowing the second player to pick a selection in a stipulated time frame, 
encrypt it and further share it with the first player, along with the public key. This is 
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stored in a block on the chain, the transaction is only approved each time, when the user 
shares their selection along with the key. The second player is only allotted a stipulated 
time which ensures that they do not attempt any unfair means of breaking the encryption 
or using any other unfair means to influence the outcome. Once the transactions are 
successfully completed, both the players share their private keys, this can help decrypt 
each of their selections. Such an exchange ensures that all the requirements are met, and 




















Illustration of Practical Situations 
 
 
 Large virtual networks rely on the internet for providing several services.  This 
puts all the users at a risk. Authorization and verification of service providers is 
uncertain. There is no surety of whether the person you are dealing with has any 
malicious intent or not [41]. Corporate companies have had a long history of cheating for 
their own gains. Over the years several car companies have been found to mess with the 
car’s onboard computers to indicate wrongful compliance with laws. Since 1970, several 
car companies have been found to using defeat devices, that can manipulate a car’s 
horsepower or mileage, by letting dirtier gas exhaust than set standards. A University of 
Denver professor, Donald Stedman, from the Chemistry department once said that the 
economics of the automobile industry make it profitable for car manufacturers to cheat. 
To maintain lower costs and high product standards, car manufacturers have been found 
to use methods that have gone against global standards for environment protection [42]. 
A study estimated that Volkswagen’s use of defeat devices has led to an estimated 36.7 
million kg of excess nitrous oxide gasses into the atmosphere, between 2009-2015 alone 
[43]. This makes it necessary to have a model which cannot be accessed by any third 
party. This also makes it necessary to have a decision-making model, involving 
autonomous cars to be independent of any interference by the agents themselves. As car 
manufacturers have been known to reprogram the automobile’s ECU for their gains, any 
trust model that can be influenced by the agents themselves cannot be implemented and 
any computational trust has to be built free from any influence from any of the agents.    
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 Computational trust is dependent on abstract notions of human trust. This means 
any models need to be built considering lack of reliable information and need to be 
uncontrolled by any involved agents. It is nearly impossible to predict how robust a 
system is with change in environment and how well it behaves under various 
assumptions. A model of trust between unknown agents only works when protocols are 
rigorously defined [44].  
 
 The model described above can be used for any situation that requires users to 
take quick optimized decisions. This can prove especially valuable to users connected via 
an IoT network. Several instances where at autonomous devices need to work together to 
achieve a common goal or make decisions without the hassle of complex optimization 
algorithms. Using blockchains to set the communication protocols for such devices can 
make them more secure, while reducing any delays in operation caused due to any 
interference from outside agents.  
 
4.1 Parking Spot   
 Smart parking has become an issue over the years, with the increase in number of 
automobiles and urban population. It has both economic and strategic advantages. 
Parking has also become a big source of revenue for many cities. With smarter parking 
services, drivers can conserve resources spent, looking for a spot. A smart parking 
ecosystem can also solve driver conflicts. With many drivers looking for a space, a 
competition occurs, and this results in cumulative parking conflicts [45]. It is important to 
 40 
not just advertise parking availability to all nearby drivers but also let them attempt to 
solve any rising conflicts to streamline the process.  
  
Considering the parking scenario as shown in figure 3.1, a private cross chain 
communication model is proposed. There are two agents (cars) that need to access a 
parking spot. Both enter a parking lot with only one spot available. The model uses a two 
key system where both are assigned their private and public keys. Data is converted into 
cash flow, the ledger updates as messages are sent across two chains with the cars acting 
as nodes. The two agents begin by forming the genesis block. The architecture for the 
model involves a threaded system. The exchange of information forms a block. The 




Figure 4.1: Message Passing 
 
 
 Threads are sets of commands that need to be executed in order, this ensures all 
necessary tasks are being performed by the system. Figure 4.2 shows the working of the 
process flow. All the transactions are recorded onto the ledger. The agents move onto the 
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next transaction once all agents confirm receipt of response from the previous step. Thus, 
the smart contract stays enforceable without any governing third parties. This is made 
possible by integrating the use of message passing and thread management.  
 






Figure 4.3: Timeline 
 
 
 The two agents play a fair game of RPSH. Appendix 1 highlights the algorithm of 
how the game is implemented and played by the two agents using blockchain. Each of 
them takes turns in making transactions. Figure 4.3 illustrates the complete process. This 
begins with the first agent choosing an option. The choice is encrypted using the keys and 
sent to the opponent. Now, the second agent knows that the first agent has decided, but 
there is no way of knowing what it is, unless he uses the private key to decrypt the data. 
The second agent now has a stipulated time to make his decision. Once the agent 
chooses, another transaction takes place where the agent shares his decision, and the key 
with the first agent. Both the agents share their private keys. This helps them know each 
other moves simultaneously. The transaction is verified along with the outcome of the 
game. The winner gets the spot. Figure 4.3 illustrates the timeline for the corresponding 
events. The timeline is divided into 6 events. The first is generate keys, where the private 
and public keys for the data encryption are generated. This is followed by the transactions 
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Figure 4.4: Transactions between the agents.  
 
 
 The complete process as shown in figure 4.5 is divided into two transactions. The 
first transaction is when the first agent sends the selection to the second agent. This leads 
to creation of the first block for both agents. The second transaction is when the second 
agent shares its selection with the first agent and the second block is created. This results 




Figure 4.5: Block summary for the model  
 
 
  As discussed earlier the hash of a block is what makes the chain tamper 
proof. Each block is connected via the hash. As seen in figure 4.5, the blocks and the 
ledger ultimately, records the decision that each agent makes. The decisions are recorded 
as cash flow and each transaction is only valid when each agent makes their choice in the 
stipulated time.  
 
 One of the interesting features of the model are message and key passing. The 
data is encrypted using the RSA algorithm. It uses a two-key method, a public and a 
private key, as illustrated in figure 4.6. The decision taken by each agent is encrypted and 
until the opposing agent makes its decision, the private key to decrypt the decisions is not 
shared. RSA is the first algorithm that can be used for encryption and to generate digital 
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Figure 4.6: RSA Encryption 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Transactions and Block Creation 
 
 
Cross chain communication plays a very important role in the complete operation. 
Considering each event as a discrete one, figure 4.9 illustrates all the points where the 
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two chains interact. Figure 4.8 is a time plot showing the formation of blocks as the 
transactions are successfully authorized. Each transaction is divided into discrete events 
and plotted versus time. The dots act as markers for each event. Comparing the two plots 
you will notice how the first block is created somewhere between 0.0070 and 0.0075s 
when the first transaction occurs between the two agents and there’s a marker at the exact 
same time on the event plot. This is when the first agent shares its decision with the 
second agent. It takes agent 2 about 0.025 seconds to respond back. The plot represents a 
private chain making transactions seamlessly with limited number of blocks. Such a 
model works similar to a public blockchain but with lesser number of blocks, it requires 
lesser computational power and easier consensus algorithms, thereby showing the 
effectiveness of private blockchains.  
 





Figure 4.9: Threat Assessment  
 
 
 Since, there is always the possibility of having malicious agents, or agents that 
don’t want to play fair. A threat assessment was done to highlight the security features of 
the model. Appendix 2 highlights the different vulnerabilities that were assessed and 
added into the simulation to ensure the communication was secure. Figure 4.9 is a box 
plot that illustrates the different attacks, that were tested. The second agent is given a 
stipulated amount of time to pick an option, if the agent fails to do so, the transaction 
fails. This discourages the agent from using any unfair means to break the encryption. It 
further ensures that the operation is completed quickly. As seen in the plot the first 
transaction where the agent takes longer than 0.6s to pick a choice, the transaction fails. 
Every blockchain transaction is only authenticated when the digital signatures for the 
participants are verified. In case the signatures are incorrect the transaction fails. Event 2 
and Event 3 represent transaction failure due to the two agents failing to use the correct 
signatures to verify the final transaction. The forking in blockchain is the problem when a 
miner or a user intentionally introduces a long chain such that the current blockchain has 
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two paths to take, in an order to access the blockchain’s data. The fourth event is where a 
couple dubious blocks are introduced as an attempt to replace the good blocks on the 
chain with malicious blocks. These were flagged and the transaction fails. The final event 
is the model with no attacks on the chain and a fair consensus is achieved resulting in a 
successful transaction.  
 It is important to note that blockchain is an integral part of the model. Using the 
privacy features of blockchain, the need for a third party is eliminated, Figures 4.10 and 
4.11 show the process flow of using a third party vs not involving a third party. The 
communication model without using blockchain can open up the situation to several 
vulnerabilities,  
• Cars can attempt to sabotage and take control of the other car’s onboard 
computer.  
• Record keeping becomes tedious and must be integrated separately. Also, it 
becomes hard to keep a record of the interaction in real time. 
• A centralized model would require higher computational power and a fair third 
party to make the decisions. 
• Transparency can be achieved since all parties involved in the chain can keep a 
track of all the interactions.  
• All data recorded is immutable and none of it can be altered, which is the most 
important advantage of using a blockchain.  
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Figure 4.10: Process involving a third party 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Process eliminating a third party 
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4.2 Forklifts Passing Through a Passage 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Forklifts Passing Through a Passage (adapted from [47]) 
 
 
 In a factory setup, there are multiple forklifts running all day. These forklifts carry 
a lot of raw material and tools from the warehouse to the manufacturing lines. They are 
an indispensable part of all logistic operations. They can be used to carry up to 8000 lbs. 
of loads. These create increased efficiencies and play an important functional role in the 
production process [48]. There are about 540,000 operators working in 300 different 
industries in the United States [49]. 
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 With a huge number of forklifts working around the country, it becomes 
important to plan out optimal route strategies for all these forklifts working round the 
clock, for all scales of operation. It is also detrimental to establish secure communication 
lines so these lifts can interact with each other as necessary and carry out their daily 
assignments. With the advent of autonomous vehicles and robots, more of these industrial 
trucks and forklifts may be made autonomous as well.  
 
 




Figure 4.14: Shared Path [51] 
 
 Consider a scenario with two forklifts wanting to access parts in the same aisle as 
shown in figure 4.12. Both are headed towards the aisle and need to pick their respective 
parts up and get it at different locations, so the production lines can stay stocked and on 
schedule. None of them can afford any and both want to take the optimal path to conserve 
energy and time. This is also true when two forklifts need to make a decision of passing 
through a door or have conflicting routes as shown in figures 4.13 and 4.14. In such 
situations it becomes necessary to establish communication between them, so both are 
aware where they are heading and avoid any mishaps. Even if both get there and avoid 
any accidents, they might reach a standstill and then need to negotiate on the path to be 
taken, this will result in delays and reduced efficiencies.  
 
 Establishing a network to connect these forklifts over a blockchain, where they 
can communicate securely and make decisions on path planning can help save a lot of 
time and increase efficiency. The forklifts use the model described above and can decide 
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on who takes the optimal path and who takes the alternative path, or they can decide on 
who enters in first and which one follows. This can help take this quick and simple 
decision without having to waste any resources.  
 
 Moreover, since all such transactions are recorded onto a ledger by the blocks, 
they can be later accessed to check for how many times were their conflicts between 
different forklifts on their path. This data can help plan future path planning operation or 
plan the time of order for such forklifts better. Thus, the model doesn’t just help avoid 
conflicts in the present but the data can be used to plan future operations in a much safer 
and efficient possible manner, without having to dedicate a lot of resources to the cause.  
 
4.3 Vehicles Switching Lanes 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Switching Lanes [52] 
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 A more everyday application for such a decision-making model would be 
autonomous vehicles achieving lane change maneuvers safely as illustrated in figure 
4.15. For various lane change maneuvers, especially on an interstate when lanes merge, it 
becomes important to take quick decisions, that not only account for change in your path 
but others as well. In such a system coordination is extremely vital. Blockchain can 
facilitate secure communication between all these vehicles. The ledger can be used for 
insurance purposes in case of accidents, as all the interactions recorded are done in real 
time and are immutable. Good and quick communication can not only save from any 
damage, but it can also conserve resources and save energy by avoiding activities like 
sudden change in speed. In such situations the model could prove to be an effective tool.  
 
 4.4 Robotics and Commercial Autonomous Vehicles 
 
 




Figure 4.17: Connected Vehicles Environment at an Intersection [54] 
 
 Swarm robotics deals with multiple robots in a connected environment dedicated 
to achieving a common goal. Figure 4.16 illustrates a situation where the robots are trying 
to work together to realize a common goal of navigating the maze. Using IoT these can 
stay connected and coordinate, blockchain can protect them from deviating from their 
goal or any outside attacks. The ledger that records all these interactions can later be 
analyzed for any optimizations in path or in control. Figure 4.17 illustrates a similar 
situation with connected autonomous vehicles at an intersection. Communication is key 
in all such situations and can lead to optimized trajectory planning and resource 
distribution. The model can essentially help make communication more secure along with 
solving any conflicts.  
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Autonomous vehicles and robots use numerous sensors to gather data about their 
environment. These also have the ability of collecting personal data of users around, 
including the location and everyday movement data. Such a situation holds multiple 
threats. First, this can be used as a surveillance system by private companies and second 
ethical decision making. Autonomous agents can further increase any bounds set for their 
own development. Autonomous vehicles operate in the public domain and thus have a 
high chance of invading the privacy of others around. Moreover, such an open network is 
susceptible to attacks, for data thefts or other malicious intent. Companies might also use 
this to their own advantages. Insurance companies might track license plate number to 
check for speeding and increase insurance rates.  They could log physical movements of 
every person in the environment and be used to stalk them. All these take place in a 
public setting and thus are at a higher risk of data loss. Autonomous cars can turn into 
new privacy invasion tools. There is no accountability to these companies of these 
devices. Nor is there any traceability of any of the data being collected. In such a 
situation, users lose any control over their data. Also, such an open network is highly 
susceptible to any attacks [18].   
 
 57 
4.5 Competing Agents 
 
Figure 4.18: Parallel Machines [55] 
 
 Several situations demand agents to compete for common processing resources. 
For example, in a parallel machine environment as shown in figure 4.18. In such cases it 
is important, to achieve the best solution for one or all agents, while making sure the 
agents left do not have to accept solutions at high costs. Such a situation can arise in 
several application environments, where negotiations are needed. Machine Language 
(ML) has been used to solve a large number of such situations including but not limited 
to, devising schedules for agents with unacceptable task timings, supply chain problems, 
scheduling trains to share railway tracks and sharing of satellite communication 
resources. It is important to serve all the different needs or objects that different agents 
might have. Some agents might accept delays, while others might accept data loss, it is 
important to keep that in mind [56]. But not all agents have enough computational power 
to support ML algorithms and these require a simpler and computationally less invasive 
methods. Moreover, some situations cannot support alternative scheduling and there are 
limited resources that agents must pick from. In such cases it is simpler to have a non-
cooperative game theory approach in settling all arguments.   
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4.6 Conflict Resolution in a Connected Vehicle Environment  
 Intersections are one of the major contributors to traffic congestion. A conflict 
zone is an intersection where different vehicles access the crossing at the same time. The 
model can be implemented to provide efficient ways for crossing vehicles and to 
cooperate with other vehicles approaching the conflict zones. Instead of a centralized 
controller, vehicles can themselves negotiate for time and space allotments. Output 
trajectories can be planned accordingly, and energy can be conserved based on optimal 
trajectory allocation. Vehicles can decide whether to yield or pass and thereby avoid 
collision [57].  
 
 Existing conflict resolution algorithms are mainly centralized, with emphasis on 
control of traffic using traffic lights. Other systems with extensive communication 
models still have conflicts between agents with same strategies. A ‘yield’ and ‘go’ model 
can still experience deadlocks in local decisions. Such methods are inefficient as they 
may require vehicles to stop even in no conflict zones. For, multiple vehicles at a 4/2 way 
intersection, it becomes a challenge to determine who must go first. A distributed conflict 
resolution mechanism should indeed be feasible, it should not be computationally 
intensive and should have a passing order for any set of vehicles passing through a 
conflict zone. Decisions should be made in real time and no two vehicles should either be 
allowed to go or yield at the same time. The priority should always be on finding a 
feasible solution [58].  
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The proposed algorithm is suitable for real time control. Only nearby agents need 
to participate and resolve the problem together, this makes it easier for them to 
communicate, instead of having a lot of agents competing for communication resources. 
Also, agents on the downstream can take charge and later decide with the passing vehicle 
on who slows down and relay this information to succeeding vehicles. Such an ecosystem 
is not computationally intensive and thus will have lesser delays and time lags. A fair 
outcome can be desired and none of the agents or car manufacturers can use any unfair 
means to influence the final decision.  
 
4.7 Intelligent Docking System 
  
 It is important to extend any smart parking mechanisms to public transportation 
systems. This has several advantages in an urban setting. In rail networks different types 
of vehicles can share the same settings. But on road bus systems need to be more robust. 
Congestions imply longer wait times, decrease in quality of service and waste of 
resources. Driverless settings can employ various sensors ranging from Lidars to 
Magnetic sensors, for placement and detection [59]. The algorithm presented can be 
employed for quicker scheduling and route picking services. Docking of a fleet of such 
vehicles can be easier scheduled with internal conflict resolution between the vehicles. 
This can be extended to a fleet of commercial trucks as well.  
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4.8 Fog Computing and Sharing of Computational Resources 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Fog Computing [60] 
  
 
 Fog computing is an extension of cloud computing with several advantages. It 
provides low latency and has a widespread distribution. It can support scalability and can 
support varied platforms. It can support a variety of critical IoT services. Fog computing 
provides computational and storage services to several end devices. This also requires 
cooperation models between users and providers that can provide services to clients. 
With more utilities and agencies switch to fog computing there will also be a need to 
assign and share resources within all providers. It can support real time analytics, for 
connected vehicle system or smart city applications. Fog computing can also support an 
IoT network with several devices and a bidirectional flow of information and resources. 
A blockchain supported IoT setting can be further integrated with fog computing, for real 








 The following simulation has been developed for the parking scenario. It is an 
application developed in python to highlight and visualize all the interactions taking place 
between the two cars (Refer to Appendix 4). The chapter focusses on the algorithm for 
key passing and the visual simulation of RPSH. It is important to highlight the 
importance of IoT in the model. Various sensors can help establish trust between the two 
agents. IoT has several advantages to offer, 
• Sensors ensure and authenticate the physical presence of a car and that it’s not just 
a bot that is trying to hold the space for some other car as illustrated in figure 5.1. 
• The internet offers a way to establish virtual communication. 
• Bigger cars can attempt to bully any smaller cars. Cars can be used to block the 
other car and hold the space. A universal virtual presence with IoT can ensure no 




Figure 5.1: Human Generated Bot Mimicking a Car. 
 
5.1 Key passing  
One important aspect of the communication between the agents is message 
passing. An encrypted message along with the public key. As this key is not enough to 
decrypt the message, it assures the opponent that the decision has been taken.  
function key_passing 
 publicexponent = 65537, keysize=2048 
publickey = rsa.generatekey(publicexponent, keysize, backend) 
encoding and serialization to generate signature 
sign(message, privatekey) //see appendix 1 for sign function 
Transaction_input.append(publickey, message) 
if Transaction.verify() == True //see appendix 1 for verify function 
 return True 
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else 
 return False 
 
One of the applications of the described model is resolving a parking issue 
between two autonomous agents. The following sections comprise of a visualization of 
the model. The agents, ‘Car 1’ and ‘Car 2’ come to a unanimous decision on deciding 
who gets a parking spot using the Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer (RPSH) decision 


















Figure 5.2: RPSH Simulation 
 
 Figure 5.2 (a) shows the beginning screen for the simulation applet. The applet 
was designed using python. Once you press the start button, the agents begin to 
communicate via a private blockchain network. Figure 5.2 (b) shows the agents begin 
initializing, a genesis block is created and each of them sends a message saying ‘hey”. 
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Next, The agent prompts the user to pick and option as shown in Figure 5.2 (c). Selecting 
it triggers the message passing algorithm. Appendix 3 discusses about the RSA algorithm 
that has been used to develop the required signatures and keys. RSA has also been used 
to encrypt the data and ensure that it is impossible to decrypt any data.  
 
 Figure 5.2 (d) shows a visual confirmation of the selection. This is extremely 
important in case of humans trying to interact with the machines. Vehicles must be 
capable of conveying information to humans interacting with the vehicle, regarding it’s 
intention and it’s performance [61]. Figure 5.2 (e) illustrates the completion of the first 
transaction. The selection is encrypted and exchanged. This prompts the second agent to 




Figure 5.3: RPSH Simulation – 2 
 
 Figure 5.3 (b) shows the final transaction, where private keys are exchanged. The 
cars decrypt each other’s selections and arrive on a mutual outcome as shown in figure 





Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
 The parking simulation shown demonstrates the effectiveness of the model. Using 
Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer, the drawbacks of the traditional game of Rock, Paper 
and Scissors have been countered. It highlights the versatility of the blockchain 
technology and how it can prove to be an important tool in governing autonomous agents, 
especially in a vulnerable environment. Companies have had a long-standing history of 
bending the rules. An environment with agents having the computational ability to take 
their own decisions, individuals with malicious intent can always try breaking into and 
sabotaging the environment for their own personal gains. An IoT environment with a 
network governed by blockchain can help build computational trust and bring 
accountability. Having an immutable blockchain ledger, with the ability to record all 
interactions in real time, helps determine faults in the system and develop solutions to 
required problems. The threat assessment shows several events where agents with 
malicious intent fail, highlighting the effectiveness of smart contracts. The method of 
Sealed Envelope Exchange gives such agents the opportunity to interact with unknown 
agents. Event plots highlight the activity of the agents in real time.  
 
 The future potential for this model is not just limited to the ability to setup 
communication between agents using blockchains, but also integrating sensors and 
making use of bio mimic logic to identify agents before they even begin interacting. 
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Exploring the ability to assign keys that act as digital identities, that can be used to 
interact over the blockchain. Such identifiers can create a safer and more trusting 
environment. Physical identification over digital keys can also help root out bots or 
computers mimicking actual vehicles. A fixed key assigned to vehicles can help develop 
strong virtual presences similar to a physical presence. It can help bring accountability to 
agents that would deliberately sabotage or attempt to delay communication in order to 
forcibly acquire the parking spot. For agents that attempt to intentionally ignore any 
competing agents and forcibly acquire spots, a digital identity can be recorded onto the 
ledger indicating proof of established communication or proof of no response. This can 
bring accountability to all agents that do not want to be fair. Digital identities can also 
indicate emergency vehicles and handicap vehicles and special permissions can be 
extended to such vehicles.  
 
 A digital presence can aid in building a universal presence for agents irrespective 
of the type of car, so conflicts between cars with varying horsepower or agents with 
varying resources can still be resolved in a fair manner, without any unfair advantages. 
Using more advanced sensor systems can help keep better records of any illegal or unfair 
ways that other agents might use to influence the decision. Records from the ledger 
indicating frequency of conflicts and traffic frequency can help plan better traffic control 






RPSH model for blockchain 
//Initialize RPSH state variables as [0,0,0,0] 
//Variables are updated as rounds progress and the agents make their selection 
Keys: 
 Generate Private keys and Public Keys using RSA 
 Public_exponent=65537 
 Keysize=2048 
 //Keys are serialized, and bytes are returned by function 
Block: 
 Initialize data and hash variables as 0 
 Data = Transaction_input  
 Previousblock = previous_block_data 
//If this is the first block, there is no previous block and the data will be updated 
//as NULL 
Previous_block_hash == Current_Block_Hash 
//If verified block is created, else ledger is updated with an error 
Compute_Hash = sha256() //python function generates hash 
//Hash for current block is updated. Hash for previous block is verified 
//If verified, hash is returned  
//Function returns True after valid block creation, else false. 
 
Sign(Message, Private Key): 
 Message is taken from user and encoded in utf-8 as bytes. 
 //Message encrypted using private keys withing a set maximum length 




 Data received from input is updated as Transaction_input 
 //Valid function checks for the correct Hash and keys  
If Transaction.valid() 
 return True 
 else 
 return False 
 
Verification(Message, Sign, Public Key): 
  
 Load serialized Public Key along with message. 
 If Signature Invalid 
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  print(“Error”)  
return False 
 Elseif 
  PreviousBlockHash == Hash 
  SelfPublicKey == LoadedPublicKey 




 Load Serialized Private Key along with message 
 If Transaction.verify() = False 
  Return False 
 else 
  Decrypt Message with Private Key 
C1 = AgentSelfChoice //The AgentSelfChoice saves the choice selection 
//by the agent themselves 
C2 = Message   
 
if C1 > C2: 
       print("C1") 
       Win = 1 
        return Win 
 else: 
       Win = 2 
       print("Win") 
       return Win 
  
//Win variable indicated which of the two agents have won 
 
UpdateLedger(Win): 
 If Win == 1 
  Load txt.dat file in write mode 
  Print to file(“Car 1 gets the spot”) 
  Close txt.dat 
 If Win == 2 
  Load txt.dat file in write mode 
  Print to file(“Car 2 gets the spot”) 
  Close txt.dat 
 
 Block.add(Win, Transaction) 
  If Block.verify(Win, sign, public key) == True 
  Block count updated. 
  Valid Block Created Successfully.  
 else 
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Threat Assessment  
Refer to figure 4.10. The threat assessment figure shows the following four threats 
that were blocked. 
1. Delayed response by the second agent  
2. Incorrect signature is used by the first agent 
3. Incorrect signature is used by the second agent 
4. Incorrect/Dubious blocks are added to the chain 
Each agent is presented with two choices, 0 or 1. Once the first agent has decided, 
the selection is encrypted and sent to the second agent. Now, the second agent has 6s to 
make their selection and make the transaction. If the agent fails to do so, the transaction 
returns a Null message, and the block creation is failed.  
function Threat1 
 Message.sign(PrivateKey)   
 Transaction1 = Transaction() 




t = time.time() 
while(t<6) 
 Transaction2_output.append(PublicKey1, Message) 
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Transaction2.verify(Message, Signature, PublicKey1) 
return True 
 return False 
 If the signatures are not verified a block cannot be authenticated as the message is 
not from whom it was intended to be.  
function verify 
 load_public_key = serialization.load_pem_PublicKey(pem, Password, backend) 
 if (load_public_key == PublicKey) 
  return True  
 else 
  return False 
function Threat2 
 Transaction_output.append(PublicKey2, Message) 
 Transaction.verify(Message, Signature, PublicKey2) 
// The function returns false and the Transaction is not verified.  
 The final threat was the creation of dubious blocks. This was verified by checking 
the hash of the block with the previous block. Since the hashes did not match, the block 
was not added, and the transaction was declined. The SHA256 function is used to 
generate all hashes. All key generation and serialization functions were used from an 






 RSA is one of the oldest public and private key generation algorithms, widely 
used in data encryption. The algorithm uses two large prime as exponents for encryption 
and decryption. The algorithm is shown in figure A3.1 [64]. 
 











from graphic import* 
import pygame, time, random 
from cryptography import serialization, default_backend, hashes 
win = graphicwin(“simulation”, 1100, 700) 
win.setbackground(color_rgb(255,255,255)) 
 
//privatekeys ex1 and ex2 are generated for encryption of selection 
 
Generate(): 
       private_key_ex_1 = rsa.generate_private_key( 
        public_exponent=65537, 
        key_size=2048, 
        backend=default_backend() 
        ) 
       private_key_ex_2 = rsa.generate_private_key( 
        public_exponent=65537, 
        key_size=2048, 
        backend=default_backend() 
        ) 
 
try: 
        public_key.verify( 
            sig, 
            message, 
            padding.PSS( 
                mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()), 
                salt_length=padding.PSS.MAX_LENGTH 
            ), 
            hashes.SHA256() 
        ) 
        return True 
    except InvalidSignature: 
        return False 
    except: 
        print("Error") 
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        return False 
 
Sign(Private_Key): 
sign = private_key.sign( 
         message, 
         padding.PSS( 
             mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()), 
             salt_length=padding.PSS.MAX_LENGTH 
         ), 
         hashes.SHA256() 
     ) 
     return sign 
  
//Define points for each car location 
 
//button def 
p1 = Point(100, 50) 







//Automated control for RPSH  
RPSH1 = random.randrange(0,1) 
























//Compare the two options 
 
*Refer to Appendix one for RSPH algorithm 
if Win == 1: 
                    t = Text(Point(550,150),"Car 1 gets the parking space") 
                    t.draw(win) 
else: 
                    t = Text(Point(550,150),"Car 2 gets the parking space") 
                    t.draw(win) 
                 
#EXIT 
                time.sleep(10) 
                t = Text(Point(550,350),"Please Close The Window To Exit") 
                window = Rectangle(Point(50,50),Point(1050,650)) 
                window.setFill(color_rgb(255,255,255)) 
                window.draw(win) 
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